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Abstract
This article intends to access the role of  governance reforms as a response 
to the challenges raised by the expansion of  normative powers in Interna-
tional and European legal orders. Arguably, traditional legal categories have 
ceased to adequately reflect the actual stage of  economic, social and legal 
cross-border relations within multiples actors and interests. Changes in In-
ternational and European law-making are indeed noticeable and result in 
many regulatory challenges derived from the increased participation of  non-
state actors. These changes produce impact via soft law instruments, such 
as recommendations, guidelines, non-binding agreements and reports. Par-
ticularly, for decision-making processes involving public interest, questions 
of  legitimacy and accountability are frequently raised in the exercise of  au-
thority. In spite of  the European Union’s particular structure, the challenges 
concerning the division and allocation of  authority at the EU level are com-
mon to those reflected at the international level. In the last decades, there 
has been an “evolution” in the EU Governance, including the development 
of  good and multilevel governance mechanisms. By implementing a deduc-
tive method, this article aims to access to what extend the EU institutional 
response can encourage and inspire the accommodation of  the international 
legal order to the current normativity changes.
Keywords: International Regulation; Global Governance; Good Gover-
nance; Legitimacy, Accountability; European Union, Non-State Actors; Soft 
Law.
Resumo
Este artigo pretende acessar o papel das reformas de governança como re-
sposta aos desafios levantados pela expansão dos poderes normativos nas 
ordens jurídicas internacionais e europeias. Possivelmente, as categorias 
jurídicas tradicionais deixaram de refletir adequadamente o estágio real das 
relações econômicas, sociais e jurídicas transfronteiriças entre múltiplos ato-
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res e interesses diversos. Mudanças no processo legisla-
tivo internacional e europeu são de fato percetíveis e ge-
ram diversos desafios regulatórios, derivados da maior 
participação de atores não estatais e do impacto de in-
strumentos de soft law, como recomendações, diretrizes, 
acordos e relatórios não vinculativos. Particularmente 
para processos de tomada de decisão envolvendo inte-
resse público, questões de legitimidade e responsabili-
dade são levantadas no exercício da autoridade. Apesar 
da estrutura específica da União Europeia, os desafios 
relativos à divisão e alocação de autoridade no nível eu-
ropeu são semelhantes aos internacionais. Nas últimas 
décadas, houve uma “evolução” na governança da UE, 
incluindo o desenvolvimento de mecanismos de go-
vernança boa e multinível. Ao implementar o método 
dedutivo, este artigo visa acessar até que ponto a re-
sposta institucional da UE pode encorajar e inspirar a 
acomodação da ordem jurídica internacional às atuais 
mudanças normativas.
Palavras-chave: Regulação Internacional; Governança 
Global; Boa Governança, Legitimidade, Accountability; 
União Europeia, Non-State Actors; Soft Law.
1 Introduction
The bursting of  geopolitical frames following glo-
balization reveal de-territorialized forms of  power and 
fragmented state sovereignty1. Changes in the norma-
tive, political and economic environment inspire new 
patterns of  allocation of  public authority and “infor-
mal” exercise of  power at the global level2. Traditional 
legal categories have ceased to adequately reflect the 
actual stage of  economic, social and legal cross-border 
relations within multiples actors and interests. Changes 
in International and European law-making are indeed 
noticeable and result in many regulatory challenges de-
rived from the increased participation of  Non-State Ac-
tors (NSAs). As far as International Law is concerned, 
there appears to exist a detachment from traditional in-
1 See WATT, HORATIA MUIR. “Party Autonomy” in interna-
tional contracts: from the makings of  a myth to the requirements 
of  global governance. European Review of  Contract Law n. 3, 
2010, p. 9.
2 See BORBOSA, Luiza Nogueira; MOSCHEN, Valesca R. B. O 
direito transnacional (“global law”) e a crise de paradigma do estado-
centrismo: é possível conceber uma ordem jurídica transnacional? 
Revista de Direito Internacional, v. 13, n. 3, 2016, p. 147.
ternational law-making3 and an erosion of  the fine line 
that separate the Public International Law field from 
other types of  regulation in the global arena4. 
These changes in the global arena, not necessarily 
addressed by instruments derived from Public Interna-
tional Law, produce impact via soft law instruments, such 
as recommendations, guidelines, non-binding agree-
ments and reports. There is no doubt that the increased 
participation of  NSAs and the impact of  soft law ins-
truments overcome the scope of  classical International 
Law tools, which no longer respond to global regulatory 
challenges. In this line, many decision-making processes 
and regulatory rules that used to be exclusively produ-
ced by national legislators have now shifted to the glo-
bal level with the participation of  NSAs. This reality has 
incited debates around issues of  legitimacy and accoun-
tability in the exercise of  authority by NSAs.
In this context, the broad concept of  global gover-
nance helps to understand the globalized legal structu-
re and also the place for International Law within this 
structure5. However, this concept remains disputed in 
academia. Esty believes that the global governance de-
bate means shifting from a state-centric view to a globa-
lized system of  checks and balances that limits national 
government’s political mistakes6. To Weiss, the gover-
nance purpose is the provision of  collective efforts to 
address “worldwide problems that go beyond the problem-solving 
capacity of  States”7. Von Bodgandy claimed that defini-
tions should not focus exclusively on the actors, but also 
on their exercises of  public authority8. In the same line, 
Zurn states that “global governance refers to the exercise of  
3 D’ASPREMONT, J.  Non-state actors in international law: os-
cillating between concepts and dynamics. In: D’ASPREMONT, J. 
(ed.). Participants in the International Legal System. Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2011, p. 326.
4 NASSER, Salem H.. Direito Global em Pedaços: Fragmentação, 
Regimes e Pluralismo. Revista de Direito Internacional, v. 12, n. 
2, 2015, p. 109-110, 128. 
5 VOLPON, Fernanda; RIBEIRO, Marilda Rosado de Sá. Desa 
os da governança energética global e a participação do brics na 
construção de um novo paradigma energético. Revista de Direito 
Internacional, v. 15, n. 1, 2018, p. 202-205.
6 ESTY, Daniel. Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: 
Globalizing Administrative Law. New Haven: Yale Law Journal, 
2006. pp. 1578-79 
7 WEISS, Thomas G.; SEYLE, Conor D.; COOLIDGE, Kelsey. 
The Rise of  Non-State Actors in Global Governance Opportu-
nities and Limitations. One Earth Future Foundation, 2013. p. 6
8 See VON BOGDANDY, Armin; PHILIPP, Dann; GOLD-
MAN, Matthias. Developing the Publicness of  Public Interna-
tional Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Govern-
ance Activities. German Law Journal, 2009. p. 1380  
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authority across national borders as well as consented norms and 
rules beyond the nation state, both of  them justified with reference 
to common goods or transnational problems”9. 
Therefore, an analysis of  the exercise of  authority 
in the international scenario enable a better evaluation 
of  international regulation as a whole. Von Bogdandy, 
Dann and Goldmann define ‘exercise of  authority’ as 
any governance activity developed by an international 
institution that affects or limits the freedom of  any 
other individual, state or institution10. Currently, norma-
tive authority is no longer exercised by a closed circle of  
high-ranking agents representing states, but has become 
an aggregation of  complex procedures involving also 
new participants11. Authority is now exercised by new 
participants, with complex structures and procedures12. 
According to Bas Arts, Global Governance encompas-
ses both intergovernmental and transnational mecha-
nisms, including state regulation, mixed regulation (by 
States and NSAs) and private self-regulation (by NSAs 
only)13.
Taking this context into account, the current article 
intends to access the role of  governance reforms as a 
response to the challenges raised by the expansion of  
normative powers in International and European legal 
orders. Indeed, alternative exercises of  normative au-
thority at both international and supranational levels 
have raised democratic concerns. As far as the Euro-
pean Union is concerned, several reforms were adopted 
in its model of  governance in the last decades, including 
the development of  good and multilevel governance 
mechanisms. Therefore, one may wonder whether the 
EU response can encourage and inspire the accommo-
dation of  the international legal order to the current 
normativity changes.
9 ZURN, Michael. A Theory of  Global Governance: Authority, 
Legitimacy, and Contestation. Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 
4.
10 VON BOGDANDY, Armin; PHILIPP, Dann; GOLDMAN, 
Matthias. Developing the Publicness of  Public International 
Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Ac-
tivities. German Law Journal, 2009. p. 1376
11 d’ASPREMONT, Jean. Non-State Actors in International 
Law: Oscillating between Concepts and Dynamics.  Routledge, 
2011. p. 4
12 d’ASPREMONT, Jean. Non-State Actors in International 
Law: Oscillating between Concepts and Dynamics.  Routledge, 
2011. p. 4
13 ARTS, Bas. Non-State Actors in Global Governance: Three 
Faces of  Power. Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemein-
schaftsgüter, 2003. p. 11
This article will first proceed with an analysis of  the 
manner in which NSAs can influence the law-making 
and regulatory processes in the international legal sys-
tem, as well as the challenges that permeate the process 
of  expanding normative powers in the international or-
der (2); in order to assess the role of  EU governance 
reforms as a response to the challenges raised by the ex-
pansion of  normative powers in International Law (3). 
2  The shift of authority beyond the 
state: the multiplicity of agents 
and interests in contemporary 
international law-making
The contemporary global order presents a multipli-
city of  agents and interests, which constitute complex 
economic, social and legal cross-border relations14. Sin-
ce States do not possess the resources to individually 
offer regulatory responses to all global challenges, other 
participants and organizations have increasingly incor-
porated normative functions in international regulation 
(2.1). This process produces benefits, but also bears 
some dilemmas, such as legitimacy claims and the lack 
of  accountability mechanisms in most international bo-
dies (2.2).
2.1 The normative contribution of NSAs
The global governance system presupposes the 
contribution of  NSAs in dealing with the provision of  
common goods and transnational problems. Althou-
gh the presence of  NSAs is not a new phenomenon, 
their role has become more prominent in recent deca-
des with globalization and increased privatization of  
government domains15. Indeed, the rise of  functional 
regimes, hybrid actors and private legislators produce a 
noteworthy impact in the processes of  rule-making and 
14 XAVIER JUNIOR, Ely Caetano; BRANDÃO, Clarissa. Desafi-
os Globais Contemporâneos: Cenário de Convergências no Direito 
Internacional. Revista Direito GV 5(2), 2009, p. 425.
15 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, Report: non state 
actors. Johasnnesburg Conference (2016); Professor Math Noort-
mann (UK): Chair; Dr Veronika Bilkova (Czech Republic): Rappor-
teur, p. 8. See also BORBOSA, Luiza Nogueira; MOSCHEN, Valesca 
R. B. O direito transnacional (“global law”) e a crise de paradigma do 
estado-centrismo: é possível conceber uma ordem jurídica transna-
cional? Revista de Direito Internacional, v. 13, n. 3, 2016, p. 147.
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decision-making4.
International law-making has also been affected by 
the increase of  NSAs’ participation. Although States 
remain the main actors of  international relations16, this 
new scenario requires scholars to tackle not only how 
these NSA can be defined, but also, how can they fit in 
the current global governance structure.
There is no official definition of  NSAs, nor a speci-
fic provision that limits their role in international law-
-making. The International Law Association (ILA), for 
example, proposes that these are entities, not controlled 
by States, capable of  playing a major role in decision 
and policymaking in the international arena17. The Eu-
ropean Commission grants a similar concept and defi-
nes NSAs as a range of  organizations, created volun-
tarily, that involve different structures of  the society, 
outside governments and public administration organs, 
in order to promote interests18. 
Some contest the inclusion of  Intergovernmental 
Organizations (IOs) in the concept of  NSAs, since, 
they are composed by States and are usually associated 
with their interests; while others debate whether entities 
considered illegitimate or illegal, such as pirate groups 
and armed opposition groups, should be included in 
this concept19. Nonetheless, if  definitions may differ, 
these multiple concepts present at least two common 
ideas: (i) their independence from governmental struc-
tures, and (ii) their relevant impact on the international 
legal system.
It is a fact that NSAs are increasingly engaging in in-
ternational law-making processes, and some might even 
have more power than an average State party20. That 
16 NASSER, Salem H.. Direito Global em Pedaços: Fragmentação, 
Regimes e Pluralismo. Revista de Direito Internacional, v. 12, n. 
2, 2015, p. 113.
17 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION. Committee on 
Non-State Actors Report of  the 2016 Johannesburg Conference. 
p. 3
18 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, 
Participation of  Non-State Actors in EC Development Policy(Brussels, 
07.11.2002, COM(2002) 598 final) 5
19  For further details, see INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIA-
TION. Committee on Non-State Actors Report of  the 2016 Johan-
nesburg Conference; INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION. 
Committee on Non-State Actors Report of  the 2012 Sofia Confer-
ence; and INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION. Committee 
on Non-State Actors Report of  the 2010 Hague Conference.
20  ZYBERI, Gentian. Non-State Actors from the Perspective 
of  the International Law Commission. Routledge, 2011. p. 167
leads us to question the current organization of  global 
governance, and how new institutions, such as NGOs 
(Non-Governmental Organizations) and multinational 
companies, may act in the system while creating benefits 
for global governance.
Decisions adopted by NSAs are usually included in 
the category of  soft-law instruments21, being of  a decla-
ratory nature. However, they may still constitute impor-
tant instruments of  enforceability in the international 
system due to their capacity to influence State’s beha-
viour and conduct. Also, non-binding rules established 
by NSAs may, eventually, result in binding legal rules22. 
In this view, Bas Arts presents three faces of  power that 
might be exercised by NSAs: (i) decisional power; (ii) 
discursive power, and (iii) regulatory power23. 
In practice, NSAs usually engage in or influence the 
drafting of  international treaties, such as the case of  the 
Geneva Conventions, in which the International Com-
mittee of  the Red Cross (ICRC) approved Article 4(g), 
therefore creating the duty to work towards a “dissemina-
tion of  knowledge of  international humanitarian law in armed 
conflicts”. Likewise, in 1992, a committee was formed to 
launch the International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
(ICBL). The group, that is now composed of  over 1,300 
NGOs operating at the national and international le-
vels, succeeded in approving the 1997 Ottawa Mine Ban 
Treaty (The Convention on the Prohibition of  the Use, Stockpi-
ling, Production and Transfer of  Anti-Personnel Mines and on 
their Destruction). The ICBL organized a working group 
responsible for encouraging the ratification, implemen-
tation and strengthening of  the Mine Ban Treaty. NSAs 
were also known to have significant roles in the develo-
pment of  the 1998 Rome Statute of  the International 
Criminal Court and in the Convention of  the Rights of  
the Child. Those are clear examples of  NSAs exercising 
both their decisional and discursive powers24. 
21 The Statute of  the International Court of  Justice, Article 38 (1), 
provides a list of  sources of  public international law, understood as 
primary and subsidiary sources. While the first are formal sources, 
such as treaties, international customs and general principles of  law, 
the latter are related to non-binding instruments, such as jurispru-
dence.
22 GIERTL, Adam; LAZOECAKOVÁ, Tímea. The Role of  
Non-Governmental Organizations in International Law-mak-
ing. IX CYIL, 2018. p.  47.
23 ARTS, Bas. Non-State Actors in Global Governance: Three 
Faces of  Power. Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemein-
schaftsgüter, 2003. 
24 the International Committee of  the Red Cross (ICRC) approved 
Article 4(g), therefore creating the duty to work towards a “dissemina-
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Furthermore, NSAs are able to influence the cons-
truction of  general principles of  law. They can lead Sta-
tes to introduce certain norms in their domestic system 
in order to analyse whether they could be considered as 
a general principle. Additionally, they might influence a 
court to consider a certain provision as a generally ac-
cepted principle by the international community25. 
It is also known that, due to their technical expertise, 
NSAs are commonly invited to participate in decision-
-making processes. Indeed, NSAs are also important 
participants in the decision-making processes in in-
ternational bodies. For instance, many UN Secretariat 
departments have ongoing working relationships with 
NGOs, in order to supplement their limited informa-
tion and resources26. Another example of  the capacity 
of  NSAs to make legal commitments concerns the ela-
boration of  codes of  conduct, voluntarily adopted by 
MNEs (Multinational Enterprises), to create corporate 
social responsibility and to guarantee the protection of  
human and environmental rights27.
Notwithstanding, despite NSAs relevance in today’s 
globalized structure, global governance also faces chal-
lenges. Due to the expansion of  global normativity, the 
line between international/domestic rule-making and 
decision-making is as fine as the borders between na-
tions, and there are no clear boundaries between ins-
titutional competences28. In this context, the increased 
participation of  NSAs inevitably highlights problems 
related to legitimacy, enforcement and accountability at 
the global level.
2.2  The normative challenges of NSAs’ exercise 
of public authority
The idea that States have (implicitly) dero-
gated some of  their competences to international 
bodies, such as the World Bank and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) is now part of  the 
global dynamic. International bodies, including 
tion of  knowledge of  international humanitarian law in armed conflicts”.
25 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION. Committee on 
Non-State Actors Report of  the 2016 Johannesburg Conference. 
p. 11
26 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION. Committee on 
Non-State Actors Report of  the 2012 Sofia Conference. p. 12
27 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION. Committee on 
Non-State Actors Report of  the 2012 Sofia Conference. p. 5 
28 ALVAREZ, Jose E. The New Treaty Makers. Boston: Boston 
College International & Comparative Law Review, 2002. p. 214
NSAs, have indeed acquired significant roles in 
global regulation in the recent years29. The rupture 
of  the traditional state monopoly in the exercise 
of  public authority opened the floor to intense 
criticism concerning the legitimacy and account-
ability deficits in the current regulatory systems. 
As a response, interested institutions are looking 
for mechanisms to boost their legitimacy, to guar-
antee the effectiveness and accountability of  their 
decisions and to implement good governance prac-
tices30.This section aims to assess the outcome of  
constant tensions caused by the shift of  authority 
beyond the state, including legitimacy (2.2.1) and 
accountability (2.2.2) concerns in the current inter-
national law-making process. 
2.2.1 Legitimacy
The idea of  legitimacy is usually associated with “the 
right to rule”. In this sense, a legitimate institution or 
court would have the justifiable right to establish rules, 
issue judgments and elaborate opinions that will be taken 
in due consideration by the international legal system31. 
As Andersen puts it, legitimacy is “the quality of  a political 
order to be able to act with the broad and largely unquestioning 
support of  its members”32. The legitimation process is com-
posed by actors who seek justifications related to their 
interests, practices and institutional designs. These jus-
tifications constitute the so-called “legitimacy claims”33.
It is important to note, however, that legitimacy can 
be understood through two different perspectives: via a 
sociological and/or a normative lens. On the one hand, 
normative legitimacy derogates from the idea that a par-
ticular institution has the right to rule on a specific mat-
29 POSTIGA, Andréa Rocha. A emergência do direito admin-
istrativo global como ferramenta de regulação transnacional 
do investimento estrangeiro direto. Brasília: Revista de Direito 
Internacional, 2013. p. 174
30 The Global Administrative Law literature offers rich contributions 
in this matter. See, for example: KRISCH, Nico; KINGSBURY, 
Benedict. The Emergence of  Global Administrative Law. In: Law 
and Contemporary Problems, vol. 68, 2005, p. 15-61.
31 COHEN, Harlan G,; FOLLESSAL, Andreas; GROSSMAN, 
Nienke; ULFSTEIN, Geir.  Legitimacy and International Courts 
- A Framework. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. p.  3
32 ANDERSON, Kenneth. Global Governance: The Problem-
atic Relationship between Global Civil Society and the United 
Nations.  WCL Research Series, 2008
33 REUS-SMIT, Christian.  International Crises of  Legitimacy. 
International Politics, 2007. p. 159
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ter34; while, on the other hand, sociological legitimacy 
is much more associated with public belief35. If  a state 
does not believe in a particular international institution, 
it most likely will not cooperate with the decisions ren-
dered by it. In other words, if  an institution is being 
discredited due to the lack of  its normative legitimacy, 
the debate is not whether others believe it has the right to 
rule, but whether it has the right to rule36.
By contrast, the debate surrounding sociological 
legitimacy relates to the idea of  public legitimacy, and 
whether the mass public believe that a court or insti-
tution has the right to exercise its authority in a certain 
domain37. These distinct approaches to legitimacy do 
not imply that both perspectives should be analysed in-
dependently. Indeed, the same institutions are subject to 
both normative and sociological legitimacy, since “whe-
ther an institution has the objective right to exercise power may 
depend in part on whether people subject to its authority it find it 
legitimate.38”
However, one of  the main criticisms in Global Go-
vernance remains the lack of  an electoral underpinning 
to make binding decisions legitimate39. Democracy is 
commonly seen as the adequate system to provide an 
effective mechanism for accountability and to justify the 
use of  authority40. Therefore, from this point of  view, 
most decisions established by international institutions 
would be illegitimate, since international authorities 
are usually not democratically elected. Yet, that line of  
thought is inaccurate for one fundamental reason: it is 
possible to legitimately establish good governance prac-
34 COHEN, Harlan G,; FOLLESSAL, Andreas; GROSSMAN, 
Nienke; ULFSTEIN, Geir.  Legitimacy and International Courts 
- A Framework. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. p.  4
35 COHEN, Harlan G,; FOLLESSAL, Andreas; GROSSMAN, 
Nienke; ULFSTEIN, Geir.  Legitimacy and International Courts 
- A Framework. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. p. 
11
36 BUCHANAN, Allen; KEOHANE, Robert O. The Legiti-
macy of  Global Governance Institutions Ethics & International 
Affairs, 2006. p. 405. 
37 VOETEN, Erik. Public Opinion and the Legitimacy of  In-
ternational Courts. Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 2013. p. 414
38 SCHAFFER, Johan Karlsson. Legitimacy, Global Govern-
ance and Human Rights Institutions: Inverting the puzzle.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. p. 8
39 ESTY, Daniel. Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: 
Globalizing Administrative Law. New Haven: Yale Law Journal, 
2006. p.  1507.
40 ESTY, Daniel. Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: 
Globalizing Administrative Law. New Haven: Yale Law Journal, 
2006. p. 1507  
tices even without direct elections41.
For instance, the United Nations provides eight es-
sential characteristics for good governance practices: 
participation, consensual orientation, accountability, 
responsiveness, effectiveness, equitability, inclusiveness 
and the use of  the rule of  law42. It also understands that 
these activities require that public participation has due 
consideration, and that minorities voices are taken into 
account in the decision-making process. Those practices 
help to legitimize authority in the international scenario 
and to maximize the benefits of  Global Governance43.
To that end, Esty argues that legitimacy in a global 
context can be achieved through different assets: effica-
cy and delivery of  good results (result-based legitimacy), 
rigorous rulemaking (order-based legitimacy), checks 
and balances structures (systematic legitimacy), public 
dialogue (deliberative legitimacy) and procedural stabili-
ty (procedural legitimacy)44. Those are the mechanisms 
that could help to remedy the absence of  democratic 
elections in international bodies. In that sense, different 
institutions may be legitimate for different reasons. For 
instance, the UN General Assembly might justify its au-
thority because of  its inclusiveness, while an Arbitral 
Tribunal might support its impartiality and procedural 
rigor to justify its actions45. 
According to Esty’s proposal46, Result-Based Legiti-
macy derogates from the expertise of  the policymaker 
and its capacity to generate social welfare benefits. That 
requires the ability to deliver good results with neutrality, 
focus and knowledge. The Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), for instance, 
is known for its technical expertise. The intergovern-
41 ESTY, Daniel. Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: 
Globalizing Administrative Law. New Haven: Yale Law Journal, 
2006. p. 1516
42 UNITED NATIONS. What is Good Governance? Available 
at <https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-govern-
ance.pdf>
43 ESTY, Daniel. Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: 
Globalizing Administrative Law. New Haven: Yale Law Journal, 
2006. pp. 1514.
44 ESTY, Daniel. Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: 
Globalizing Administrative Law. New Haven: Yale Law Journal, 
2006. p. 1516
45 MENDES, Joanna; VENKZE, Ingo. Allocating Authority: 
who should do what in European and International Law- In-
troducing the Idea of  Relative Authority. Hart Publishing, 2018. 
pp. 3-4.
46 ESTY, Daniel. Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: 
Globalizing Administrative Law. New Haven: Yale Law Journal, 
2006. p. 1516
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mental organization implements a policy of  data and 
information exchange, benchmark performances and 
review policy results. Additionally, it constantly organi-
zes meetings with ministers to cooperate and discuss 
relevant issues. In a similar manner, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) - even though it lacks public par-
ticipation mechanisms - adopts technical processes in 
its Appellate Body, such as notices of  appeal, consistent 
base of  jurisprudence and rational mechanisms for de-
cision making in order to increase its legitimacy47.
Alternatively, Order-Based Legitimacy derives from 
the need to clarify rules and impose order to a certain 
community, providing traditional structures and stabili-
ty. The Systematic Legitimacy, on the other hand, requi-
res institutions to adopt checks and balances structures 
in order to guarantee the rule of  law. This might occur 
through the process of  spreading responsibilities across 
different agents and international bodies, creating a sys-
tem of  cooperation among authorities. On the other 
hand, Deliberative Legitimacy enhances the debate in 
the rulemaking process. The main idea is that, due to 
the broad range of  views, deliberation promotes a more 
rational, carefully constructed and improved decisions. 
Lastly, the Procedural Legitimacy requires that interna-
tional agents act within the right process and follow the 
established rules to improve its outcomes. 
Therefore, it is possible to ensure the legitimacy 
of  international institutions regardless of  the fact that 
their representatives are not democratically elected. Yet, 
in order to remedy the democratic deficit and improve 
its sociological legitimacy, institutions are encouraged 
to adopt good governance structures to engage in the 
public debate, establish orders and produce great out-
comes.
2.2.2 Accountability
The lack of  accountably also draws much criticism. 
Over the recent years, there has been a massive increase 
of  international rules and decisions made by NSAs and 
international regulatory bodies. Along with the growing 
tendency of  globalization, accountability deficits have 
been put into question by many global institutions, such 
47 ESTY, Daniel. Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: 
Globalizing Administrative Law. New Haven: Yale Law Journal, 
2006. pp. 1543-1549
as the IMF, WTO and the World Bank48. However, only 
weak - if  any - accountability mechanisms have been 
properly implemented49. Nagel argues that it is common 
for national regimes to implement responsibility mecha-
nisms but, when referring to a global regime, there is 
no similar responsibility mechanism of  social justice for 
the citizenry of  the states affected by the implemented 
decisions50. 
As far as the United Nations are concerned, accoun-
tability is considered as one of  the five critical principles 
in order to build good governance practices51. Krisch, 
for instance, states that there is a need for accountability 
whenever “a responsible power-wielder has such an impact on 
the autonomy and equality of  individuals in the affected popula-
tion that democratic regulation is warranted”52. The Council 
of  Europe defines accountability as the possibility of  
an agent to be liable and to give “account or explanation of  
actions and, where appropriate, to suffer the consequences (...) if  
it should appear that errors have been made”53. 
Schedler analyses the concept through two different 
perspectives: answerability and enforcement. The first 
one is related to the obligation to inform and provide 
details on the decisions, while the latter refers to the 
possibility of  punishment in cases where the authority 
is caught in improper behaviour54. Thus, accountability 
in global governance should not only ensure that the 
decision-making process is transparent, but also guaran-
tee the power to remove political actors in the global 
sphere. In other words, accountability in global gover-
nance depends not only on building transparent mecha-
48 LAFONT, Cristina. Accountability and global governance: 
challenging the state-centric conception of  human rights. Tay-
lor & Francis, 2010. p. 193
49 SCHOLTE, Jan Aart. Civil Society and Democratically Ac-
countable Global Governance. Blackwell Publishing, 2004. p. 1
50 NAGEL, Thomas. The Problem of  Global Justice.  Blackwell 
Publishing, 2004. pp. 139-40. As cited by LAFONT, Cristina. Ac-
countability and global governance: challenging the state-cen-
tric conception of  human rights. Taylor & Francis, 2010. p. 197
51 UNITED NATIONS. Policy Note Global governance and 
global rules for development in the post-2015 era. United Na-
tions, 2014. p. 15 
52 KINGSBURY, Benedict; KRISCH. Global Governance and 
Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order. 
The European Journal of  International Law, 2006. p. 6
53 EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY 
THROUGH LAW. Report on the Democratic oversight of  the 
Security Service. Council of  Europe, 2007. p. 4.
54 SCHEDLER, Andreas. Conceptualizing Accountability. 
Lynne Rienner, 1999. pp. 13 - 15, as cited in  HALE, Thomas N. 
Transparency, Accountability, and Global Governance. Brill, 
2008. pp.  74-75
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nisms, but also on establishing clear commitments and 
goals, review processes and “follow-up” mechanisms 
to guarantee compliance. This means that the idea of  
accountability should not be seen as an end in itself, 
but rather as a mechanism to achieve good governance 
results55. 
Additionally, Mendes argues that, while tools to se-
cure accountability are essential for ensuring legitimacy 
in global governance, they do not provide us with any 
guidelines as to who should do what in the international 
legal system56. According to her, “accountability is concer-
ned with who gives account to whom, with the question of  how an 
actor gives account, and with which possible consequences”. Thus, 
the concept of  accountability is closely related to the 
distribution of  power among different institutions and 
agents. As a consequence, there is still need for exami-
ning the issue of  how responsibilities should be distri-
buted between different international institutions and 
regulatory bodies. 
For that reason, a well-functioning system of  separa-
tion of  powers, that provides the engagement between 
institutions, is essential to enhance accountability in the 
global system57. In this sense, global governance should 
not be merely based on the traditional and abstract idea 
of  separation of  powers, but rather on a realistic system 
of  checks and balances based on what a particular insti-
tution can contribute with58. Therefore, the current ten-
dency is to depart from a traditional tripartite division 
of  powers and to move towards a concept of  relative 
authority59. This idea indicates that global governance 
55 UNITED NATIONS. Policy Note Global governance and 
global rules for development in the post-2015 era. United Na-
tions, 2014. p. 15
56 MENDES, Joanna; VENKZE, Ingo. Allocating Authority: 
who should do what in European and International Law- In-
troducing the Idea of  Relative Authority. Hart Publishing, 2018.
57 CAROLAN, Eoin; CURTIN, Deirdre. In Search of  a New 
Model of  Checks and Balances for the EU: Beyond Separa-
tion of  Powers. In: Allocating Authority: who should do what 
in European and International Law- Introducing the Idea of  
Relative Authority. Hart Publishing, 2018. p. 72
58 Eoin Carolan, Deirdre Curtin, In Search of  a New Model of  
Checks and Balances for the EU: Beyond Separation of  Pow-
ers.In: Allocating Authority: who should do what in European 
and International Law- Introducing the Idea of  Relative Au-
thority. Hart Publishing, 2018. p. 54. See also MENDES, Joanna; 
VENKZE, Ingo. Allocating Authority: who should do what in 
European and International Law- Introducing the Idea of  
Relative Authority. Hart Publishing, 2018. p. 18. 
59 MENDES, Joanna; VENKZE, Ingo. Allocating Authority: 
who should do what in European and International Law- In-
troducing the Idea of  Relative Authority. Hart Publishing, 2018. 
should be articulated and not diffused. It is not about 
divisions, but connections60. 
Certainly, the search for an effective alternative to 
overcome legitimacy and accountability concerns is a 
demanding task for international scholars due to the 
complex character of  the global governance debate and 
structures. Nonetheless, although faced with sophisti-
cated institutional particularities and constant political 
tensions, the European Union was able to adopt mul-
tiple governance reforms in the last decades as an at-
tempt to minimize the democratic distress. 
3  The evolution of EU Governance: 
from gradual reforms towards an 
articulated method of governance
When it comes to international governance, authori-
ty is often dispersed and fragmented. In worldwide or-
ganizations, intergovernmental rule-making, rule-appli-
cation and rule-enforcement processes are inadequately 
supported and ‘constitutionally restrained’61. Globally, 
there is no centralized regulatory institution; rather, a 
plurality of  legal orders is arrayed horizontally and ver-
tically, publicly and privately.62 In this context, discus-
sing the distribution and organization of  powers in the 
European Union can be insightful for global legitimacy 
claims due to EU’s potentially instructive conceptual 
and practical developments63. 
At the European level, the challenges concerning 
the division and allocation of  authority are similar to 
those found at the international level, and this in spite 
of  the EU’s particular structure64. EU policy-making, 
p. 18
60 MENDES, Joanna; VENKZE, Ingo. Allocating Authority: 
who should do what in European and International Law- In-
troducing the Idea of  Relative Authority. Hart Publishing, 2018. 
p. 11. 
61 PETERSMANN, Ernst-Ulrich (ed.), Multilevel Governance 
of  Interdependent Public Goods Theories, Rules and Institu-
tions for the Central Policy Challenge in the 21st Century, Flor-
ence: European University Institute, 2012, p. 196.
62 CAFFAGI, Fabrizio, CARON, David D. “Global Public Goods 
amidst a Plurality of  Legal Orders: A Symposium”. The European 
Journal of  International Law Vol. 23 no. 3, 2012.
63 MENDES, Joanna; VENKZE, Ingo. Allocating Authority: 
who should do what in European and International Law- In-
troducing the Idea of  Relative Authority. Hart Publishing, 2018. 
p. 6.
64 MENDES, Joanna; VENKZE, Ingo. Allocating Authority: 
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for example, involves multiple public and private actors 
at different levels of  government65. When searching for 
alternatives to minimize legitimacy and accountability 
concerns in decision-making processes, one might con-
sider EU’s articulated models of  governance which are 
oriented by good governance principles and a multilevel 
governance approach.
In response to the growing institutional 
criticism in the early 2000’s and to the community’s 
distrust in the EU’s capacity to deal with worldwide 
problems, the Commission identified the need to 
reform the European governance66. At that time, 
EU traditional legal concepts were no longer suf-
ficient to “make sense of  the way things work let 
alone to regulate the policy making process”67. In 
an attempt to build more inclusive and accountable 
policy strategies, the Commission proposed good 
governance principles to guide Member States, lo-
cal authorities and civil society towards a more ef-
fective system (3.1)68. Then, almost 20 years later, 
as the challenges persisted, initiatives of  multilevel 
governance gained prominence in Europe (3.2).
3.1 EU good governance principles
The European Union defines governance as “the 
rules, processes, and behaviour by which interests are articula-
ted, resources are managed, and power is exercised in society”69. 
who should do what in European and International Law- In-
troducing the Idea of  Relative Authority. Hart Publishing, 2018. 
p. 3-6. “Drawing lessons or inspiration does not mean to emulate”.
65 BÖRZEL, T. A.; HEARD-LAURÉOTE, Karen. Networks in 
EU Multi-Level Governance: Concepts and Contributions. Journal 
of  Public Policy, Vol. 29, No. 2, Networks in European Union 
Governance (Aug., 2009), pp. 135-151. According to the author, 
“While there is broad scholarly agreement that policy-making in the 
European Union (EU) involves a multitude of  public and private 
actors at different levels of  government, there is less agreement 
whether the EU should be conceptualized as a form of  governance 
by networks or governance in networks”.
66 DEHOUSSE, Renaud. Misfits: EU Law and the Transformation 
of  European Governance. In: JOERGES, Christian, DEHOUSSE, 
Renaud. Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market. Ox-
ford University Press, 2002.
67 DEHOUSSE, Renaud. Misfits: EU Law and the Transformation 
of  European Governance. In: JOERGES, Christian, DEHOUSSE, 
Renaud. Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market. Ox-
ford University Press, 2002, p. 227.
68 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. European Governance. Euro-
pean Union, COM (2001) 428, 2001. p. 7
69 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, The European Parliament and 
the European Economic and Social Committee - Governance 
Hence, influential change in the distribution of  power 
and decision-making should be accompanied by gover-
nance changes. In the beginning of  the 21th century, 
there was a feeling that EU traditional legal categories 
have “ceased to adequately reflect the actual operation 
of  the EU’s machinery”70. The emergence of  new ac-
tors – such as the EU administrative agencies71- and 
the technical complexity of  policy-making illustrated a 
“discrepancy between legal perceptions and functional 
realities” in the EU72.
In the context of  governance reforms, the concept 
of  ‘good governance’ gained importance. This concept 
may be understood through two complementary lenses: 
as a process of  governance or as an outcome of  gover-
nance. For instance, the United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights proposes five characteristics of  good 
governance: transparency, responsibility, accountability, 
participation, and responsiveness73. This implies that 
good governance is more associated with the process 
and development of  its policies than with its results. By 
contrast, the UN Resolution 2000/64 associates good 
governance practices with the “growth and sustainable hu-
man development”74. The UN Resolution 2000/64 also no-
tes that good governance practices will necessarily vary 
according to different societies’ particular circumstan-
ces and needs. 
Within the EU framework, the Committee of  the 
and Development. European Union, COM (2003) 615, 2013. para 
1.4
70 DEHOUSSE, Renaud. Misfits: EU Law and the Transformation 
of  European Governance. In: JOERGES, Christian, DEHOUSSE, 
Renaud. Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market. Ox-
ford University Press, 2002. 
71 For specific challenges involving accountability of  EU agencies, 
see: VOS, Ellen. Making Informal International Law Accountable: 
Lessons from the EU. In: PAUWELYN, Joost; WESSEL, Ramses 
A; WOUTERS, Jan. Informal International Lawmaking. Oxford 
University Press 2012, p. 376.
72 DEHOUSSE, Renaud. Misfits: EU Law and the Transformation 
of  European Governance. In: JOERGES, Christian, DEHOUSSE, 
Renaud. Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market. Ox-
ford University Press, 2002. 
73 UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE 
HIGH COMMISSIONER. Good Governance and Human 
Rights. United Nations, 2008. as cited in  BRADLEY, Andres; 
SLOCUM-BRADLEY, Nikki. Is the EU’s Governance ‘Good’? 
An assessment of  EU Governance in its partnership with ACP 
States. UNU Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies 
Working Papers W-2010/1, 2006. p. 6.
74 BRADLEY, Andres; SLOCUM-BRADLEY, Nikki. Is the EU’s 
Governance ‘Good’? An assessment of  EU Governance in its 
partnership with ACP States. UNU Institute on Comparative Re-
gional Integration Studies Working Papers W-2010/1, 2006. p.  6.
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Regions (CoR) is an important institution for the imple-
mentation of  good governance practices. The Charter 
for Multilevel Governance in Europe states that the CoR 
is committed to promote citizen participation, cooperate 
with public authorities, and strengthen institutional ca-
pacity building and transnational cooperation75.
The 2001 White Paper on European Governance 
presents five principles to achieve changes in governan-
ce practices: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness 
and coherence76. In order to promote openness and partici-
pation, the Commission suggests that institutions work 
together with Member States to implement mechanis-
ms of  communication and use clear and understandable 
language for the general public. These practices might 
enhance the public’s trust and confidence in the Union. 
Indeed, the Paper was open to public consultation for 
nine months - which already points to the Commission’s 
commitment to promote openness and transparency in 
its procedures. The feedback was largely supportive of  
the mentioned principles, but other proposals, such as 
the addition of  democratic legitimacy and subsidiarity 
principles77, were also suggested.
However, these principles would not be effective wi-
thout practical mechanisms and proposals. The Com-
mission mentioned, for instance, that it would adopt 
standards for public consultation and publish them in a 
code of  conduct by the end of  200178. Furthermore, it 
also committed to the publication of  guidelines on the 
use of  expert advice in order to provide more accounta-
bility, plurality and integrity in its decisions79. The 2001 
European Governance White Paper further suggests 
that “the Community Method” should be implemented to 
guarantee good governance practices within the Union. 
It presents the mechanism as a means to conciliate di-
fferent interests of  the Commission, Council and Eu-
ropean Parliament80. According to the Commission, the 
method “ensures the fair treatment of  all Member States from 
the largest to the smallest” and promotes the diversity and 
75 THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS. Charter for Multi-
level governance in Europe. Title 2 
76 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. European Governance. Euro-
pean Union, COM (2001) 428, 2001. p.10
77 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Report from the Commission 
on European Governance. European Union, 2003. p. 7.
78 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. European Governance. Euro-
pean Union, COM (2001) 428, 2001. p. 11
79 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. European Governance. Euro-
pean Union, COM (2001) 428, 2001, 19
80 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. European Governance. Euro-
pean Union, COM (2001) 428, 2001, 8
effectiveness of  the Union.
The exercise of  authority by EU agencies have also 
been subject of  accountability and legitimacy concerns. 
The agencies are usually autonomous entities and often 
composed by national, European and stakeholders’ re-
presentatives81. Stronger dialogue with civil society has 
become part of  their regulatory strategy to stimulate 
“public confidence in EU action” 82. The involvement 
of  stakeholders and citizens can be traced as a parcel of  
good governance83. In addition, as an outcome of  rich re-
gulatory networks, the production of  influential non-le-
gally binding documents illustrates the performance of  
informal law-making in EU Agencies. As a consequence, 
a set of  control and accountability mechanism have been 
designed and implemented in the last decades84.
Another example of  the application of  good gover-
nance principles can be seen in the 2018 Communica-
tion to the Commission. In the auspices of  the ‘Better 
Regulation agenda’, the referred Communication indi-
cates that the European Commission has, in addition to 
the information provided in its website, created several 
online consultation tools, such as ‘Transparency Portal’, 
‘Transparency Register’, ‘Financial Transparency Sys-
tem’, ‘Facilitating access to documents’85.
No doubt remains that principles of  transparency 
81 VOS, Ellen. Making Informal International Law Accountable: 
Lessons from the EU. In: PAUWELYN, Joost; WESSEL, Ramses 
A; WOUTERS, Jan. Informal International Lawmaking. Oxford 
University Press 2012, p. 372.
82 VOS, Ellen. Making Informal International Law Accountable: 
Lessons from the EU. In: PAUWELYN, Joost; WESSEL, Ramses 
A; WOUTERS, Jan. Informal International Lawmaking. Oxford 
University Press 2012, p. 379.
83 VOS, Ellen. Making Informal International Law Accountable: 
Lessons from the EU. In: PAUWELYN, Joost; WESSEL, Ramses 
A; WOUTERS, Jan. Informal International Lawmaking. Oxford 
University Press 2012, p. 379.
84 VOS, Ellen. Making Informal International Law Accountable: 
Lessons from the EU. In: PAUWELYN, Joost; WESSEL, Ramses 
A; WOUTERS, Jan. Informal International Lawmaking. Oxford 
University Press 2012, p. 376-80. According to Vos, three set of  
mechanisms have bene implemented: “instruments that precondi-
tion the exercise of  powers by the agencies and/or their creation; 
instruments that monitor and review agency activities; and instru-
ments that promote responsiveness of  agencies. It is the author 
opinion that: “overall we can thus conclude that many arrangements 
to control and hold agencies accountable have been set in place. 
Shortcomings relate to the unfolding of  accountability mechanisms 
in practice as well as the tensions between the Parliament, the Com-
mission, the Council, and Member States, as well as the consequent 
multiplicity of  controls of  accountability lines.”
85 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. European Governance. Brus-
sels, COM (2018) 7703, 19,20
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and accountability are important to respond to legiti-
macy concerns. Good governance principles can be es-
sential to achieve trust, especially for improving public 
administration in the Member States and making the 
public sector’s management and accountability more 
effective86. However, according to Joana Mendes and 
Ingo Venzke’s theory, they might not be sufficient to 
that end87. The authors affirm that the implementation 
of  accountability and transparency mechanisms only 
access the legitimacy issue when the authority is exer-
cised without control or visibility88. This means that 
such good governance principles might not address 
the institution’s decision-making competences in the 
division and allocation of  authority, neither take into 
consideration the dynamic relation between different 
institutions.
After almost 20 years since the debates on good go-
vernance started, challenges remained, and initiatives of  
‘multilevel’ or ‘multilayer’ governance emerged in the 
EU. Whereas the 2001 White Paper on EU Governan-
ce prescribes five substantive principles underpinning 
good governance (openness, participation, responsibili-
ty, effectiveness and coherence), multilevel governance 
has essentially a procedural nature and was elaborated 
to ensure the implementation, maintenance and enhan-
cement of  these principles89.
3.2  The European multilevel governance 
approach
In the context of  the EU, there are many conno-
tations of  the multilevel governance theory90, which 
relate to different phenomena91. The concept was ori-
86 GRIMHEDEN, Jonas, TOGGENBURG Gabriel N.. The 
Right to Good Administration in the Multilevel System of  the 
European Union—A “Newish” Right Strengthening the Adminis-
trative Culture. Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, 2016.
87 MENDES, Joanna; VENKZE, Ingo. Allocating Authority: 
who should do what in European and International Law- In-
troducing the Idea of  Relative Authority. Hart Publishing, 2018. 
p. 7. 
88 MENDES, Joanna; VENKZE, Ingo. Allocating Authority: 
who should do what in European and International Law- Intro-
ducing the Idea of  Relative Authority. Hart Publishing, 2018. p. 7.
89 THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS. Multilevel Gov-
ernance. European Union, 2009. p. 5
90 HORGA, Joan; FLORIAN, Gyula Laszlo. Multilevel Gov-
ernance (MLG) And Subsidiary Principle In White Paper Of  
MLG Of  The Committee Of  The Regions (COR). Munich: 
University Library of  Munich, MPRA Paper No. 44854, 2011. p.2.
91 PANARA, Carlo. Multi-Level Governance as a Constitu-
ginally created by political scholars who were interested 
in understanding and explaining the functioning of  EU 
decision-making processes. Subsequently, scholars un-
derstand that multilevel governance became a normati-
ve and a legal concept92. 
In 2009, the European Committee of  the Regions, 
an EU advisory board composed of  regional and local 
authorities, prepared the White Paper on Multilevel Go-
vernance in order to reinforce partnership tools across 
Europe. It has defined multilevel governance (MLG) as 
“coordinated action by the European Union, the Member States 
and local and regional authorities, based on partnership and ai-
med at drawing up and implementing EU policies”93. Among 
other goals, MLG should allow the Union to evaluate 
the impact of  its directives on regional and local levels94. 
It also reassures the “community method” as the cor-
nerstone of  European Governance95.
This White Paper has a fundamentally “procedural” 
character as it lays down guidelines regarding how de-
cisions are to be taken in the EU96. According to the 
Committee of  the Regions: “MLG emerges, therefore, as a 
“method” or “approach”: the appropriate method or approach, 
according to the CoR, for bringing together and coordinating the 
action of  the different levels of  government in the EU multi-level 
system”.97 Taking the subsidiarity principle into account, 
MLG aims for the integration of  different layers of  
government in policy and law making processes, con-
sidering the adoption of  various mechanisms, such as 
consultation and territorial impact analyses. 98 
MLG departs from the premise that EU depends on 
the mode of  governance and on various players’ con-
tributions in order to address legitimacy, efficiency and 
tional Principle. HKJU-CCPA 16(4), 2016. p.706.
92 PANARA, Carlo. Multi-Level Governance as a Constitu-
tional Principle. HKJU-CCPA 16(4), 2016. p.706.
93 THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS. Scoreboard for 
Monitoring Multilevel Governance (MLG) at the European 
Union level. European Union, 2011
94 THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS. Scoreboard for 
Monitoring Multilevel Governance (MLG) at the European 
Union level. European Union, 2011. p. 29.
95  THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS. Scoreboard for 
Monitoring Multilevel Governance (MLG) at the European 
Union level. European Union, 2011. p. 8.
96 PANARA, Carlo. Multi-Level Governance as a Constitu-
tional Principle. HKJU-CCPA 16(4), 2016. p.711.
97 PANARA, Carlo. Multi-Level Governance as a Constitu-
tional Principle. HKJU-CCPA 16(4), 2016. p.711
98 THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS. Multilevel Gov-
ernance. European Union, 2009. p. 5
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visibility issues.99 Applying a multilevel approach to go-
vernance means going beyond participation and consul-
tation, and further promoting a more dynamic system 
by ensuring greater responsibility for all actors involved 
(shared responsibility). Therefore, MLG aspires a comple-
mentary balance between institutional and partnership-
-based governance. 100
Consequently, EU MLG should also involve interpar-
liamentary cooperation and strengthening of  law-making 
democratic legitimacy101. In fact, MLG dynamical character 
prevents it from being solely understood through the 
lens of  the traditional division of  powers102. According 
to the 2009 White Paper, having an institutional fra-
mework which involves different levels of  government 
is not enough to guarantee good governance. That is 
because good cooperation between different legitimate 
political and democratic roles is vital and has to be ba-
sed on trust and not on confrontation103.
The non-traditional EU structure of  separation of  
powers can be an example of  the dynamic multilevel 
governance approach. EU accountability mechanisms 
are based on apolitical arrangements, such as technical 
overview of  comitology committees and the use of  
benchmarking, in which EU regulations and directives 
are continually revised to ensure a transparent and ratio-
nal system of  separation of  powers104. This illustrates a 
kind of  interactive accountability that does not focus on 
a limited tripartite division of  functions.
Seen in these terms, Carolan and Curtin argue that 
the EU would highly benefit from a concept of  sepa-
99 THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS. Multilevel Gov-
ernance. European Union, 2009. p. 4
100 THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS. Multilevel Gov-
ernance. European Union, 2009. p. 4.
101 THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS. Multilevel Gov-
ernance. European Union, 2009. p. 9.
102 THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS. Multilevel Gov-
ernance. European Union, 2009. p. 5.
103 THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS. Multilevel Gov-
ernance. European Union, 2009. p 8: “European democracy would 
be reinforced by more inclusive and flexible interinstitutional co-
operation and by more sustained political cooperation between the 
various levels of  power; European political parties, which are a par-
ticularly important element for strengthening the European political 
sphere and thus helping to develop a political culture of  multilevel 
governance.”
104 CAROLAN, Eoin; CURTIN, Deirdre. In Search of  a New 
Model of  Checks and Balances for the EU: Beyond Separa-
tion of  Powers. In: Allocating Authority: who should do what 
in European and International Law- Introducing the Idea of  
Relative Authority. Hart Publishing, 2018. p. 73
ration of  powers in accordance with empirical eviden-
ces of  institutional practices and not on a general idea 
of  division of  functions105. This division of  limits and 
competences among the institutions is best understood 
as the principle of  institutional balance. Jean-Paul Jacqué ar-
gues that, according to this principle, institutions should 
act “within the limits of  their competences”106. That does not 
imply, however, that legislators, when drafting treaties, 
are required to establish the exact tasks and weights that 
each institution should be given. According to Lenaerts 
and Verhoeven, despite the concept’s imprecise con-
tours, it plays an important role in inspiring a balanced 
government and in fighting against the democratic defi-
cit107. Therefore, the institutional balance system could 
be used to divide and articulate powers between diffe-
rent institutions in the international community.
Distributing functions is also essential for one logi-
cal reason: in most countries, it is impractical that the 
legislators, given their limited time and resources, make 
every decision. Thus, it might be necessary to delega-
te functions to an executive body. Likewise, in the EU, 
the legislature (the Council and the Parliament) cannot 
be responsible for all the highly technical and detailed-
-oriented regulations. For this reason, many decisions 
are delegated to an executive body (the Commission). 
Therefore, the concept of  comitology refers to the idea 
that the Council confers certain implementing powers 
to the Commission that, along with the committees 
(with national representatives of  states), engage in a 
rule-making process108.
Furthermore, a strict tripartite division would indi-
cate that a decision made by one of  the three main ins-
titutional organs (Parliament, Council and Commission) 
represented the final exercise of  power. However, the 
reality is much different. For instance, when performing 
its functions, the Commission Hearing Officers in the 
105 CAROLAN, Eoin; CURTIN, Deirdre. In Search of  a New 
Model of  Checks and Balances for the EU: Beyond Separa-
tion of  Powers. In: Allocating Authority: who should do what 
in European and International Law- Introducing the Idea of  
Relative Authority. Hart Publishing, 2018.  p.74, 75
106 JACQUÉ, Jean-Paul. The Principle of  Institutional Bal-
ance. Common Market Law Review, 2004. p.383
107 LENARTS, Koen, VERHOEVEN, Amaryllis. Institutional 
Balance as a Guarantee for Democracy in EU Governance. . In: 
JOERGES, Christian, DEHOUSSE, Renaud. Good Governance 
in Europe’s Integrated Market. Oxford University Press, 2002.
108 WEILER, J.H.H; KOCJAN, M. European Community Sys-
tem: Comitology. Teaching Material for the Jean Monnet Center at 
NYU School of  Law, 2004. p. 5
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EU are faced with messy institutional structures and are 
forced to cross the lines of  a theoretical idea of  a tripar-
tite division. Likewise, autonomous actors, such as the 
European Central Bank and the Court of  Justice of  the 
European Union, are compelled to engage in articula-
tion processes with other actors in order to implement 
their policies and decisions109.
In this context, MLG gains importance: developing 
an efficient system of  checks and balances depends on 
how different institutions interact with one another. 
The EU comitology system is a way of  demonstra-
ting this non-centralized interaction. It includes about 220 
committees that discuss and decide on all European 
regulations. The key purpose of  this system is to find 
the most technical choice that benefits the Union over 
the national government’s individual interests110. This 
shows that these sub-central processes of  decision-
-making are examples that a limited tripartite division 
is not sufficient to be applied to EU’s dynamical reality. 
That system is important not only for practical reasons 
- to avoid burdening the workload of  the Council -, but 
also to provide more legitimacy to the regulatory pro-
cess. Because of  its numerous technical processes and 
national government’s contributions, comitology is cen-
tral to ensure democracy in the Union, and its exercise 
of  power is of  fundamental importance111.
In order to put multilevel governance into practi-
ce, in 2011 the Committee of  the Regions required its 
own participation in agreements between the European 
Parliament, the Council and the European Commission 
to deal with evaluation and consultation mechanisms, 
within the ‘Better Lawmaking’ action. It also called on 
the European Commission to “ensure ready access for local 
and regional authorities to comitology and to groups of  experts 
109 CAROLAN, Eoin; CURTIN, Deirdre. In Search of  a New 
Model of  Checks and Balances for the EU: Beyond Separa-
tion of  Powers. In: Allocating Authority: who should do what 
in European and International Law- Introducing the Idea of  
Relative Authority. Hart Publishing, 2018. p. 55
110 CAROLAN, Eoin; CURTIN, Deirdre. In Search of  a New 
Model of  Checks and Balances for the EU: Beyond Separa-
tion of  Powers. In: Allocating Authority: who should do what 
in European and International Law- Introducing the Idea of  
Relative Authority. Hart Publishing, 2018. p.75
111 ST. CLAIR, Bradley Kieran. Comitology and the Law: 
through a glass, darkly. Common Market Law Review,1992. p. 
720, as cited in WEILER, J.H.H; KOCJAN, M. European Com-
munity System: Comitology. Teaching Material for the Jean Mon-
net Center at NYU School of  Law, 2004. p.7
responsible for implementing the plan”.112 Moreover, for the 
purposes of  effectively implementing MLG, the Com-
mittee of  the Regions created the Scoreboard on Multi-
level Governance, which monitors, on a yearly basis, the 
impacts and developments of  MLG in the European 
Union113.
Another example of  alternative and multilevel inte-
raction can be seen as far as EU agencies are concerned. 
Indeed, various instruments have been tailored to fit 
specific agency’s needs to promote higher transparency 
and accountability. Overall, the “vertical form of  politi-
cal, democratic accountability, public accountability, and 
redundancy accountability” have been combined with 
horizontal mechanisms, such as codes of  conduct and 
multiple actors’ participation in the decision-making 
process114. 
4 Conclusion
The expansion of  the global governance regime, 
together with the increased participation of  NSAs in 
international law-making raises questions about the su-
fficiency of  traditional sources of  international law. The 
new scenario not only instigates the investigation of  the 
impact of  normativity changes, but also strengthen the 
search for possible responses to the events that do not 
fit into the existing formal categories. Abandoning a 
state-centred paradigm, however, should not be confu-
sed with the idea that authorities or actors in the global 
governance structure cannot be held accountable115. Ra-
ther, it calls for a change of  perspective, in which the 
focus is on the exercise of  public authority by a state, a 
hybrid or a private agent that affects somebody’s free-
dom 116; and therefore, should be regulated.
112 THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS. Multilevel Gov-
ernance. European Union, 2009. p. 21.
113 THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS. Scoreboard for 
Monitoring Multilevel Governance (MLG) at the European 
Union level. European  Union, 2011. p. 2.
114 VOS, Ellen. Making Informal International Law Accountable: 
Lessons from the EU. In: PAUWELYN, Joost; WESSEL, Ramses 
A; WOUTERS, Jan. Informal International Lawmaking. Oxford 
University Press 2012, p. 381.
115 VON BOGDANDY, Armin; PHILIPP, Dann; GOLDMAN, 
Matthias. Developing the Publicness of  Public International 
Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Ac-
tivities. German Law Journal, 2009. p. 1380  
116 VON BOGDANDY, Armin; PHILIPP, Dann; GOLDMAN, 
Matthias. Developing the Publicness of  Public International 
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From a global governance perspective, how can 
International Law address the emergence of  new par-
ticipants which is necessarily followed by democratic 
concerns? In the current framework of  international 
regulation, the European instructive conceptual and 
practical developments can be insightful for addressing 
global challenges, as similar normative problems appear 
both at the international and regional levels. In order 
to minimize legitimacy and accountability concerns, one 
might look for EU articulated models of  governance 
that follow good governance principles and reach for 
multilevel governance system specially designed for 
particular regulatory demands.
As far as global governance is concerned, since there 
is no global authority to compel actors to accomplish 
global achievements, policy interdependence and inter-
national cooperation seem to be an interesting alterna-
tive. International law could also support and facilitate 
the integration within institutions – typically fragmen-
ted- and create common norms and rules favorable to 
the provision of  global public goods117. Yet, this should 
be guided by a multilevel governance approach, since 
the promotion of  goods depends on State’s voluntary 
commitment and compliance, on the sense of  collective 
purpose, and on national systems118. 
The European model for distribution of  powers 
and accountability may not be ideal for all types of  re-
gulatory regimes in the global sphere. Nonetheless, it 
illustrates a non-tradition institutional setup, which is 
not shaped to respond to a tripartite division of  powers 
closely connected to specific government branches119. 
Within concrete practices, the EU insightful system 
divides and connects authority in specific ways that 
aims to combine each institution’s assets to democratic 
governance120, by applying good and multilevel gover-
Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Ac-
tivities. German Law Journal, 2009. p. 1376.
117 See KAUL, Inge; GRUNBERG, Isabelle; STERN, Marc A. 
(eds). Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 
21th Century. OUP, 1999,
118 See PETERSMANN, Ernst-Ulrich, Multilevel Governance 
of  Interdependent Public Goods Theories, Rules and Institu-
tions for the Central Policy Challenge in the 21st Century, Flor-
ence: European University Institute, 2012.  
119 MENDES, Joanna; VENKZE, Ingo. Allocating Authority: 
who should do what in European and International Law- In-
troducing the Idea of  Relative Authority. Hart Publishing, 2018. 
p. 18. 
120 MENDES, Joanna; VENKZE, Ingo. Allocating Authority: 
who should do what in European and International Law- In-
nance principles. For both European and International 
purposes, good governance and multilevel governance 
approaches may assist the search for appropriate solu-
tions to the challenges of  international regulation in ti-
mes of  normativity change.
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